
By Phen Weston
The Right-Wing Comment Section and the Gaslighting of Reality
There is a special kind of stupidity that lives in the right-wing social media comment section.
Not ordinary stupidity. Not the innocent kind. Not the sort that comes from not knowing something and being willing to learn. This is something harder, louder, and far more smug. It is stupidity with its chest puffed out. Stupidity that thinks a flag emoji is an argument. Stupidity that has mistaken confidence for intelligence, cruelty for honesty, and repetition for truth.
It is not merely ignorance. Ignorance can be helped. Ignorance can ask questions. Ignorance can say, “I didn’t know that.” What thrives in these comment sections is something more committed than that. It is wilful stupidity. Stupidity as identity. Stupidity as team sport.
The right-wing comment section is not a place where people gather to understand the world. It is a place where they gather to avoid understanding it. They arrive with the answer already loaded. Migrants did it. Trans people did it. Muslims did it. The left did it. Woke did it. Vegans probably did it somehow. The facts are not examined. They are sorted according to whether they flatter the grievance.
This is why evidence has such a hard time surviving there. Evidence walks into the comment section and is immediately mugged by anecdotes, laughing emojis, and men called Gaz saying “wake up sheeple” beneath a screenshot they did not read. A statistic appears, and someone replies with “lies.” A journalist reports something, and someone calls it “mainstream media propaganda.” An expert explains the context, and someone who thinks research means watching YouTube in bed declares it “woke nonsense.”
The point is not to prove anything.
The point is to make truth feel impossible.
That is the gaslighting at the heart of it. The right-wing comment section does not simply lie. It attacks the whole idea that truth can be known. Every source is corrupt unless it agrees with them. Every expert is compromised unless they confirm the prejudice. Every victim is lying unless they are useful. Every correction is censorship. Every consequence is persecution. Every disagreement is proof that “you can’t say anything anymore,” usually written directly beneath the thing they have just said, publicly, for the nine hundredth time.
This essay is not claiming that every person with conservative views is stupid. Nor does it claim that abuse, dishonesty or bad-faith argument exist only on the right. That would be too easy, and too weak. The argument is more specific: right-wing and far-right comment ecosystems reward a recognisable pattern of projection, insult, denial, scapegoating and truth-reversal. The original post may provide the spark, but the comment section supplies the chorus. It is where a claim becomes a mood. It is where doubt becomes certainty. It is where a rumour is repeated until it feels like common sense.
A post says something. The comment section tells people what it means.
That distinction matters. A news report might say police have not yet named a suspect. The comment section says they are hiding something. A court record might say a person was convicted for inciting racial hatred. The comment section says political prisoner. A hate-crime statistic might show that Muslims, Jews, migrants or trans people are being targeted. The comment section says fake numbers, two-tier policing, what about our own. The comment section is not just reaction. It is translation. It translates reality into grievance.
The clearest recent British example remains Southport. After the murder of three children in July 2024, false claims spread online that the attacker was a Muslim asylum seeker called “Ali Al-Shakati”. The House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee later recorded that this false or unfounded information circulated within hours, and that the police were limited in what they could release because of legal restrictions (House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, 2025).
That initial lie mattered. But the comment section is where the lie became socially useful. It gave people permission to say what they already wanted to say. It allowed “concern” to become accusation. It turned grief into racial suspicion. It turned an information gap into a conspiracy-shaped hole and then filled it with Muslims, migrants and asylum seekers.
The scale was not trivial. Between 29 July and 9 August 2024, false or unfounded claims about the Southport attacker achieved 155 million impressions on X. Across social media, the false name was seen 420,000 times, with a potential reach of 1.7 billion people. The Committee also recorded that the false material was promoted through platform tools, appearing in X’s “Trending in the UK” and TikTok’s “Others searched for” features (House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, 2025).
But numbers alone can make this sound abstract. The comment section itself shows the mechanism more clearly.
In the sentencing remarks for Jordan Parlour, the court recorded a Facebook exchange during the 2024 disorder. Parlour posted that people should attack the Britannia Hotel in Leeds, where refugees and asylum seekers were living. One person replied: “I’m down if you are my lad.” Parlour then responded with a time to begin. The court noted that the initial post received six likes, but it was visible to 1,500 Facebook friends and, because of the account’s privacy settings, could be forwarded beyond that circle (R v Parlour, 2024).
That is the comment section in miniature. Not a grand manifesto. Not a carefully written article. A post, a reply, a bit of encouragement, a time, a target, a crowd.
The comment section does not need intellectual depth to be dangerous. It needs permission. It needs the little digital nod from someone else. It needs the sense that other people are thinking it too. “I’m down if you are” is not a theory of politics, but it is a theory of belonging. It says: I hear the dog whistle. I am ready. Tell me when.
This is why comment sections matter more than they are often given credit for. They are not merely below-the-line litter. They are the social workshop of political meaning. They turn isolated prejudice into shared confidence. They show the hesitant reader that cruelty has an audience. They tell the already angry man that he is not alone. They turn the phrase “people are saying” into something visible.
Academic research supports this. Thiele’s study of right-wing populist user comments on Facebook found that such comments increased the number of replies but worsened the deliberative quality of debate (Thiele, 2022). Hostile comment environments can also trigger more hostile comments over time, creating a downward spiral of hostility (Humprecht, Hellmueller and Lischka, 2020). In other words, the comment section is not a neutral container. It changes the conversation it hosts.
That is why the repeated insults matter. They are not just bad manners. They are tools.
“Traitor.” “Nonce.” “Groomer.” “Idiot.” “Woke scum.” “Freak.” “Mental.” The vocabulary is not broad, but it is revealing. The insult does the work that thought cannot. It ends the conversation before it has to become a conversation. It turns the target into something beneath response. It reassures the group that they do not need to think because they have already degraded the person speaking.
In comment-section terms, the insult has three jobs. It attacks the target. It entertains the audience. It signals loyalty to the group.
That is why the language is so repetitive. Nobody needs to say anything original. They only need to say the recognised thing. The approved thing. The thing that proves they know who “we” are and who “they” are. A comment section full of identical insults is not evidence of mass independent thought. It is a chant.
Then comes the gaslighting.
The right-wing commenter will often say there is no racism here, only legitimate concern. No transphobia, only questions. No Islamophobia, only criticism. No cruelty, only realism. No incitement, only frustration. No pile-on, only free speech. And when the words are quoted back, the meaning evaporates. “That’s not what I meant.” “You’re twisting it.” “It was a joke.” “You lot are obsessed.” “Can’t say anything anymore.”
This is one of the central tricks of the comment section: it creates a visible record and then denies the record while it is still sitting there.
The court cases from the Southport disorder show how thin that defence can become. Lucy Connolly pleaded guilty after posting on X calling for mass deportation and for hotels housing immigrants to be set on fire, adding: “If that makes me racist, so be it.” The Crown Prosecution Service said she had encountered false information claiming the killer was a Muslim asylum seeker who had arrived by boat, and that racist tweets had also been sent from her account before and after the Southport attacks (CPS, 2024).
Again, that was a post, not a comment beneath someone else’s article. But the logic is the same logic that fills the replies: atrocity becomes excuse, rumour becomes permission, and the person posting imagines herself not as someone inciting hatred but as someone saying the forbidden truth.
Tyler Kay’s case shows the same pattern. The court recorded that he posted material on X in the context of widespread disorder and racial hatred, then tried to explain it as humour or naïveté. The judge rejected that account, saying the nature of the posts was self-evident and that the overall tone clearly revealed a racist mindset (R v Kay, 2024).
The key point is not that every nasty comment becomes a crime. Most do not. The point is that the criminal cases reveal the ordinary mechanics of the wider comment culture: denial, bravado, racial suspicion, then retreat into “only joking” once consequence arrives.
Projection is part of the same machinery.
The people most addicted to outrage call everyone else triggered. The people who cannot survive a rainbow lanyard call everyone else snowflakes. The people who spend all day blaming minorities for social collapse accuse others of “division.” The people who believe every rumour that flatters them accuse others of being brainwashed. The people who scream about free speech are often the first to demand sackings, bans, boycotts, deportations and silence the moment someone says something they dislike.
In the comment section, projection is not a bug. It is the operating system. Every accusation becomes a confession with a flag in its bio. They call others fragile while melting down over pronouns. They call others hateful while sneering at refugees. They call others authoritarian while fantasising about police violence. They call others sheep while repeating the same five phrases in the same order under every post about migration, trans rights, Palestine, climate change or race.
This is what makes the comment section so exhausting. You are not debating an argument. You are fighting a loop.
The loop usually works like this. First, deny the source. Then replace the evidence with an anecdote. Then insult the person providing the evidence. Then accuse them of being hateful. Then claim victimhood. Then move the subject. Then say you were only asking questions. Then repeat.
It is not Socratic dialogue. It is a washing machine full of flags.
The platforms intensify this because comment sections are not displayed neutrally.
Engagement matters. Visibility matters. Replies, likes, shares and outrage matter. Research by Vosoughi, Roy and Aral (2018) found that false news on Twitter spread farther, faster, deeper and more broadly than true news, while later research on Twitter/X found that engagement-based ranking amplified divisive, emotionally charged content more than content ranked by users’ stated preferences (Milli et al., 2025).
That matters because the worst comment is not always the fringe comment at the bottom. Sometimes it becomes the most visible one because people reply to it, mock it, argue with it, screenshot it, rage at it, or rally behind it. The platform does not need to believe the comment. It only needs the comment to perform.
This is why “just ignore them” is often too simple. Ignoring can be wise for individual sanity. But structurally, the comment remains part of the public atmosphere. It teaches other readers what can be said. It tests boundaries. It normalises contempt. It tells lurkers where the crowd is leaning.
The Meta Oversight Board’s 2025 review of three Facebook posts from the UK riots gives a useful example of how quickly that atmosphere can harden. The Board overturned Meta’s original decisions to leave the posts up, concluding that each created a risk of likely and imminent harm during a period of contagious anger and growing violence. One text-only post called for mosques to be smashed and buildings where “migrants,” “terrorists” and “scum” lived to be set on fire. The other cases involved likely AI-generated anti-Muslim imagery linked to protest mobilisation (Meta Oversight Board, 2025).
That material is not “the comment section” in the narrowest sense, but it is the same communicative ecology. Posts, replies, shares and comments blur into one another. A post becomes a comment on a rumour. A comment becomes a call to action. A reply becomes confirmation. A like becomes approval. A screenshot becomes evidence. The architecture is messy, but the direction of travel is clear.
The harm also appears in official data. In the year ending March 2025, police in England and Wales recorded 137,550 hate crimes. The Home Office recorded rises in race and religious hate crime outside the Metropolitan Police comparison area, and religious hate crimes targeted at Muslims rose by 19%, with a spike after the Southport murders and the disorder that followed (Home Office, 2025).
A fair counterargument says correlation is not causation. Correct. A spike in hate crime does not prove that one comment caused one attack. But this is not a courtroom claim about one comment and one offence. It is an argument about an ecosystem. False information about Southport spread rapidly. Anti-Muslim and anti-migrant content surged. Platforms amplified and recommended material. Comment threads and social media exchanges helped turn suspicion into mobilisation. Mosques, asylum accommodation and racialised communities were targeted. Official bodies treated the online environment as a serious factor, not as harmless background noise (House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, 2025).
Another counterargument says the left does this too. Of course left-wing comment sections can be cruel, smug, simplistic, abusive and ridiculous. Nobody who has spent five minutes online should deny that. But “other people are also bad” is not analysis. It is evasion. The Southport disorder did not follow a left-wing rumour that the attacker was a landlord, banker or Tory donor. It followed false anti-Muslim and anti-migrant claims which were then absorbed into a pre-existing right-wing grievance culture.
Specific evidence requires specific conclusions.
A stronger counterargument says people have legitimate concerns about immigration, crime, housing, public services and social cohesion. Yes. They do. Housing pressure is real. GP access is real. School places are real. Wage insecurity is real. Rapid social change can be difficult. Public trust has been damaged. People are not bigots simply because they notice strain.
But the comment section does not usually pause there. It takes strain and gives it a face. The migrant. The Muslim. The refugee. The trans person. The “woke” teacher. The disabled claimant. The activist. The foreigner. The comment section turns policy failure into a person to hate.
That is the grievance machine at work: the wound is real; the scapegoat is the lie. Britain has been damaged, but migrants did not close the libraries. Muslims did not break the NHS. Refugees did not make rent impossible. Trans people did not hollow out the high street. Black communities did not sell off the future. Disabled people did not underfund public services. The people being spat at in comment sections are not the architects of the misery being blamed on them.
Another counterargument says this is censorship. It is not. Criticism is not censorship. Moderation is not automatically tyranny. Evidence is not authoritarian. A person has the legal and moral right to hold ugly opinions, but they do not have a sacred entitlement to have those opinions algorithmically promoted, monetised, recommended, protected from criticism and laundered as truth.
The free-speech argument in these spaces is often strangely one-directional. They want the right to insult, but not to be called cruel. They want the right to accuse, but not to be corrected. They want the right to spread suspicion, but not to have sources placed in front of them. They want the freedom to speak and the freedom from hearing what their speech reveals.
This is why anticipating the response to this essay is part of the essay.
When this is posted, the comment section is likely to become its own primary source. Some replies will call it “lefty tears.” Some will call it “woke nonsense.” Some will say it proves the author hates ordinary people. Some will reject every cited source as propaganda while offering screenshots, rumours or anecdotes as proof. Some will say “you can’t say anything anymore” while saying it publicly, beneath the post, in front of everyone. Some will use exactly the insults named here, then accuse the essay of being insulting. Some will say they are “just asking questions” while refusing every answer already supplied.
That does not prove every claim in advance. But it does illustrate the pattern: projection, insult, denial, reversal, grievance and the refusal of correction. The essay says the stove is hot. The comment section will put its hand on the stove and call the burn censorship.
For that reason, the response thread should be preserved as an appendix if this essay is published. Not to dox ordinary users. Not to harass anyone. Names and profile pictures should be removed. But anonymised replies can be grouped by function: insult, source denial, victimhood, projection, racial scapegoating, free-speech reversal, and “yeah, but” evasion. If the replies behave as expected, they will not refute the essay. They will perform it.
The answer is not to become polite to the point of uselessness. Nor is it to sneer at everyone caught inside the machine. Sneering is easy. It is also often politically stupid. People fall into grievance politics for reasons that are not always imaginary. They are frightened. They are broke. They are lonely. They feel abandoned. They know something has gone wrong.
But pain explains susceptibility. It does not excuse cruelty.
A politics worth having must name the wound without accepting the scapegoat. It must take public anger seriously without surrendering to racial blame. It must say yes, Britain is damaged, and no, the people in the asylum hotel did not do the damage. It must say yes, public services are collapsing, and no, that does not make the Muslim family at the bus stop your enemy. It must say yes, trust has been broken, and no, the answer is not to believe every anonymous account with a flag emoji and a persecution complex.
The right-wing comment section will call this elitist because it contains evidence. It will call it hateful because it names hate. It will call it censorship because it criticises speech. It will call it divisive because it refuses scapegoating. It will call it stupid because that is easier than reading.
Let it.
The record is there. The pattern is there. The thread beneath the post will probably place itself neatly into the archive.
The stupidity is loud. The gaslighting is relentless. The projection is endless. The insults are boring.
But noise is not knowledge.
And cruelty is not courage.
References
Crown Prosecution Service (2024) ‘Updated with sentence: Childminder admits inciting racial hatred over social media post’, 17 October.
Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978) Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order. London: Macmillan.
Home Office (2025) Hate Crime, England and Wales, Year Ending March 2025. London: Home Office.
House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee (2025) Social Media, Misinformation and Harmful Algorithms. London: House of Commons.
Humprecht, E., Hellmueller, L. and Lischka, J.A. (2020) ‘Hostile emotions in news comments: A cross-national analysis of Facebook discussions’, Social Media + Society, 6(1).
Meta Oversight Board (2025) Posts Supporting UK Riots. Meta Oversight Board.
Milli, S., Carroll, M., Wang, Y., Pandey, S., Zhao, S. and Dragan, A.D. (2025) ‘Engagement, user satisfaction, and the amplification of divisive content on social media’, PNAS Nexus, 4(3), pgaf062.
Mudde, C. (2019) The Far Right Today. Cambridge: Polity Press.
R v Connolly (2024) Sentencing Remarks. Birmingham Crown Court.
R v Kay (2024) Sentencing Remarks. Northampton Crown Court.
R v Parlour (2024) Sentencing Remarks. Leeds Crown Court.
Thiele, D. (2022) ‘How right-wing populist comments affect online deliberation’, Media and Communication, 10(4), pp. 141–154.
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D. and Aral, S. (2018) ‘The spread of true and false news online’, Science, 359(6380), pp. 1146–1151.
Wodak, R. (2020) The Politics of Fear: The Shameless Normalization of Far-Right Discourse. 2nd edn. London: Sage.